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THE TROUBLE WITH CITY OF BOERNE, AND WHY IT
MATTERS FOR THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT AS WELL
EVAN TSEN LEEt
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court's test for the constitutionality of state action
and its test for the constitutionality of congressional legislation enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment are out of synch with one another. When a
plaintiff challenges state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
degree of scrutiny varies with the type of claim. Racial classifications,
for example, are examined under strict scrutiny. Most classifications,
such as disability, age, or socioeconomic status, are examined on a ra-
tional basis. When Congress acts pursuant to its Section 5 powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment to protect rights, however, the Court has no
corresponding spectrum of degrees of scrutiny. In this Lecture, I argue
that the Court should adopt the "mirror image" spectrum of scrutiny for
congressional enactments pursuant to its Section 5 powers. For example,
if Congress seeks to protect people from age discrimination or discrimi-
nation based on disability by permitting individuals to sue states without
their consent in federal court, the plaintiff should have to show that he or
she actually suffered a constitutional violation in the case at bar. If Con-
gress seeks to protect people from race discrimination, the plaintiff
should have to show only that there is a rational, means-end relationship
between the congressional remedy and the targeted discrimination. Ap-
plying this test to the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits race dis-
crimination in voting, the courts should apply rational, means-end scru-
tiny to statutes such as the Voting Rights Act, including the preclearance
condition that is presently before the Court in Shelby County v. Holder.
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I. INTRODUCTION
My topic today is how the federal courts should handle congres-
sional enactments purporting to enforce two of the three Reconstruction
Amendments-the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.' These issues
have been important for fifty years now, and their importance has not
diminished in the least. Last Term, the Supreme Court decided one such
case under the Fourteenth Amendment, Coleman v. Court of Appeals,2
and it seems likely that the Court will soon review a case involving pre-
clearance under the Voting Rights Act,3 which obviously grows out of
the Fifteenth Amendment.4
The Supreme Court's current approach to judging congressional
legislation meant to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment comes from a
1997 case called City of Boerne v. Flores,5 which I believe to be correct
in one important respect and seriously misguided in another. Today, I
will call for the repudiation of that second aspect of City of Boerne, to be
replaced by something I call the "mirror image" approach. Finally, I will
say why I think this has implications for legislation, such as the Voting
Rights Act, enacted pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I ("The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 ("The
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
Why have I not extended my approach to the Thirteenth Amendment? I have chosen to
save this topic for another day because my instinct is that Congress should have the very broadest
latitude when legislating under Section 2 of that Amendment, simply because there is no state action
requirement, and therefore, there are little or no federalism costs involved in such legislation.
2. 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (plurality opinion).
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
4. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed 81
USLW 3064 (U.S. July 20, 2012) (No. 12-96).
5. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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H. WHAT IS THE CITY OFBOERNE FRAMEwORK?
In City of Boerne, the question was whether the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA)6 was an "appropriate exercise" of Congress's
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The relevant
characteristic of RFRA was its attempt to legislatively overrule the Su-
preme Court's decision in the so-called peyote case, Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith.8 In City of Boerne, the Court ruled that in order for a con-
gressional enactment under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
pass muster, it must "enforce" constitutional rights, and the remedy cho-
sen for enforcement must be "congruen[t] and proportional[]" to those
rights.9
The decision in City of Boerne answers three important questions
related to the appropriateness of legislation under Section 5. The first
question is whether the power to enforce constitutional rights includes
only situations involving actual violations of constitutional rights or
whether it also includes deterrence of potential constitutional violations.
The second question is, for purposes of scrutinizing Section 5 enforce-
ment legislation, Who decides what constitutional rights are cognizable?
That is, who interprets Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-
Congress or the courts? The third question is, assuming at least some
deterrence of potential constitutional violations is permissible, How
should the courts decide how much deterrence is appropriate? This third
question has the potential to overlap the first question.
On the first question, City of Boerne unambiguously held that some
deterrence of constitutional violations is permissible. Today, all of the
Justices adhere to that position except Justice Scalia, who argues that
Congress may only legislate remedies for people who can demonstrate
that their personal Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated.'o
On the second question, at least in theory, there are three possible
answers. When it comes to who decides what constitutes a cognizable
constitutional right for purposes of judging appropriateness under Sec-
tion 5, (1) Congress itself could have the last word; (2) the Court could
give some level of deference to Congress's interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment; or (3) the Court could decide the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment with no deference to Congress's interpretation.
The City ofBoerne Court chose the third-no deference.
6. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993),
invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
7. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 517.
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
10. Importantly, however, he would make an exception in the race discrimination cases be-
cause of stare decisis. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557-65 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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On the third question, having already decided that Congress may act
to prevent potential constitutional violations, the Court further decided
that all remedial legislation must be congruent and proportional to such
potential constitutional violations. A literary analysis of the phrase "con-
gruent and proportional" suggests a fairly non-deferential standard of
review, as in the requirement of a tight, if not perfect, fit between the
remedy and the constitutional rights to be protected. We will see that
subsequent cases confirm this literary analysis. We will also see that if
one agrees with Justice Scalia on the first question-every plaintiff must
show his or her own constitutional violation-that answers the third
question about the relationship between right and remedy.
III. THE MERITS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF CITY OF BOERNE
Those were the answers provided by City of Boerne, and I will now
examine those answers. I am going to take the questions out of order,
because my views on questions two and three do, in fact, affect my view
on question one.
A. Who Decides What the Constitution Means?
Let us start with question two-Who decides what counts as a vio-
lation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment for purposes of Sec-
tion 5? I think we have to rule out Congress having the last word on the
interpretation of "Equal Protection" or "Due Process." It is theoretically
possible to have one interpretation of these grand phrases for purposes of
scrutinizing remedial legislation and an entirely different interpretation
for purposes of scrutinizing state action. But there is little to recommend
such a schizoid system. Constitutional law is confusing enough.
The two remaining options, then, are to accord some deference to
Congress's interpretation of the rights enumerated in Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment or to give them no deference whatsoever. Of the
two, I think the more tenable view is for the courts to accord congres-
sional interpretation no deference-but with an important asterisk. The
reason not to accord congressional interpretation deference is the one I
just gave-we ought not have two interpretations of "Equal Protection"
or "Due Process" or "Privileges and Immunities" for one purpose and a
different interpretation for another purpose. If the Court defers, even
somewhat, for one purpose, it will potentially create that difference.
Here is the asterisk. The Court should be open to the persuasive
force of Congress's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Con-
sider the peyote case, in which the Court held that the Free Exercise
Clause does not apply to any law of general applicability (i.e., so long as
it does not single out any religion for negative treatment, a law cannot
violate free exercise). In RFRA, Congress tried to reinstate the case law
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overruled in Smith, which (at least in theory) had held that any law bur-
dening the exercise of religion was subject to strict scrutiny."
Deference to Congress's attempted reinstatement to the previous
case law would have required the Court to accept Congress's interpreta-
tion unless it failed some kind of test, whether rationality or something
else. I think the Court should have considered whether Congress's inter-
pretation could have been folded into the Court's view without compro-
misiig the basic principle that the Court found in the Free Exercise
Clause. The basic principle of Smith is that government cannot be pro-
hibited from achieving legitimate, across-the-board legislative goals by
claims that such enactments infringe on religious practices. But that prin-
ciple could easily have been preserved if the Court had simply ruled that
the Free Exercise Clause protected the ritual use of peyote by a group
with a sincere, longstanding practice, that the ritual was central to the
religion, and that the effects of ritual peyote use did not impact the per-
formance of employees. The peyote law could have been held unconsti-
tutional as applied to the type of usage in the case at bar. This is not any-
thing close to the strict scrutiny that Congress had tried to impose
through RFRA-yet at the same time it incorporates the values that Con-
gress saw in the Free Exercise Clause into the Court's core interpretation
of the Clause.
Thus, I agree with the general approach of City of Boerne on the
matter of who finally decides what the Constitution means. It must be the
courts. But the courts should take seriously what values Congress finds
immanent in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and they should
try to accommodate those values in a manner not inconsistent with the
principles that the Court itself finds in the Fourteenth Amendment. To
reiterate, however, once the United States Supreme Court has completed
that analysis-whether it finds anything in Congress's view persuasive
or not-there remains only a single interpretation of the right involved,
and that is the Court's.
B. What Relation Must There Be Between Rights and Remedies?
I now turn.to the third question, which is what relationship congres-
sional remedies must bear to the constitutional rights needing protection.
City of Boerne held that such remedies must be congruent and propor-
tional to the constitutional rights needing protection.12 With one reluctant
reservation, I reject that view.
The congruence and proportionality standard is poor judicial
craftsmanship. It provides no real guidance to Congress, the lower
courts, or lawyers as to what enforcement legislation will pass muster. In
11. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) (applying strict scrutiny to a
free exercise claim).
12. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (1997).
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the end, concluding that a remedy is not congruent and proportional to
the record of constitutional violations before Congress amounts to little
more than the statement, "These shoes don't feel good on me." If it takes
twenty minutes with a shoehorn and pliers to get the shoes on, yes,
they're too small. If you have to scrunch up your toes to keep them from
flopping off every other step, they're too big. But in between those ex-
tremes, you can't just look at someone standing in a pair of shoes and tell
whether they are a good fit. Only that person can really tell.
One might say that it does not matter because the Supreme Court is
going to review all these statutes itself and the Nine will decide whether
the shoes fit. But that is not a sufficient answer. Congress constantly
amends and updates many of these statutes, such as the Voting Rights
Act. Each time it amends, the contours of the shoe change. Moreover,
feet change size over time too. The conditions in American society are
constantly changing-in some ways for the better, in others for the
worse. The Supreme Court cannot, and should not have to, grant review
every time statutes are updated or conditions change. Never mind the
expenditure of judicial resources-the sheer lag time will create injustic-
es that ought not be tolerated.
But if not congruence and proportionality, then what? At one end of
the spectrum lies a highly deferential rationality test. Dean Evan
Caminker argued several years ago that the Court should judge all con-
gressional legislation under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by
the same standard as analyses conducted under the Commerce Clause-
the highly deferential McCullough v. Marylandl3 means-end test.14 At
the other end of the spectrum, Justice Scalia has taken the position that
Congress may only provide remedies for actual violations of the Four-
teenth Amendment-in other words, that Congress may only authorize
people to sue if the plaintiff can prove a constitutional violation in the
case at bar.15 Under Justice Scalia's test, the relationship between remedy
and right is always one to one.
IV. WHAT SHOULD REPLACE CITY OF BOERNE?
My position is that there should be no single test for.the permissible
relationship between right and remedy. The test should depend on the
type of scrutiny the Court would employ when testing state action for
constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment. The kind of scrutiny
that the Court imposes on congressional remedies should mirror the
13. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
14. Id. at 421; see also Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Sec-
tion 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1127, 1133, 1161 (2001). This position once commanded a majori-
ty of the Court, at least with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
15. Lane, 541 U.S. at 558-61, 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting he would permit some
prophylaxis in the race discrimination cases on the basis of stare decisis).
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Court's well-established levels of scrutiny in examining the constitution-
ality of state action. As you all know, the level of scrutiny in examining
state action depends on what kind of right is at stake. Classifications
based on race, national origin, alienage, and a few other things trigger
strict scrutiny.16 A classification based on sex triggers intermediate scru-
tiny.17 Almost all other kinds of state action are judged on a "rational
basis"-if there is a rational relationship between the state action and a
legitimate governmental purpose, the action is not unconstitutional. 8
I will call my position the mirror image thesis. By that, I simply
mean that the scrutiny the Court applies to congressional enactments
under the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment should
be the mirror image of the scrutiny that the Court already applies to
judge the constitutionality of state action. Thus, under my argument, if
the classification or right at stake triggers strict scrutiny, then Congress
should be permitted to authorize broad prophylactic measures-anything
that is rationally related to eradicating or preventing race discrimination
by state actors. If the classification or right at stake triggers only rational
basis review, then I will argue that Congress may authorize the courts to
remedy only constitutional violations that have already occurred. For
rights that trigger intermediate scrutiny, I will argue for something in the
middle. Finally, I will urge that the Court apply the same rationale to the
Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from discriminating on the
basis of race in voting.
No one should be astounded by my thesis. The tiers-of-scrutiny
framework can ultimately be traced back to a source no less august than
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,19 which sug-
gested that the Court ought to have a narrower presumption of constitu-
tionality for legislation aimed at discrete and insular minorities.20 Nor am
I the one who has tied Congress's enforcement powers under the Four-
teenth Amendment to these tiers of scrutiny-the Court did that at least
as far back as 2006.21 In this Lecture, I am merely asking the Court to tie
the review of Congress's legislation to the tiers of scrutiny in a precise
manner, and to treat the Fifteenth Amendment as it treats the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Why am I attracted to the mirror image thesis? Two reasons. First, it
perfectly matches Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
16. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986); Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 278-79 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
18. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425-26 (1961).
19. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
20. Id at 152 n.4.
21. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-75 (2001).
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ment with the states' duties under the Fourteenth Amendment. The more
fundamental and historically rooted the states' failures to perform their
duties under the Fourteenth Amendment, the less the Judiciary should
interfere with Congress's attempts to enforce those duties. The less pro-
found that history of state failure, the less leeway Congress ought to have
in legislating remedies.
A. Recent Case Law
A review of the Court's modem jurisprudence respecting congres-
sional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment starts with the "new
federalism" cases of the early 1990s. During the time the Court was
pruning back the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez,2 2 it was
scaling back Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in City ofBoerne.
Not long thereafter, the Court handed down three more cases strik-
ing down statutes as improper under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank,23 Congress had amended the patent laws
to authorize private suits for damages against state governments for pa-
tent infringement. 24 The Court held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not provide Congress the power to enact such a law.
True, patent law creates property interests, and the Due Process Clause
as it applies against the states prohibits takings without due process. But
the Court found that Congress had failed to identify any pattern of un-
constitutional patent infringement by the states. Consequently, the Patent
Remedy Act2 5 was not congruent and proportional to any actual history
of constitutional violations by the states.
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,26 some former employees of
the Florida State University sued the school for money damages under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),2 7 claiming that
certain pay adjustments discriminated against older employees. 28 Wheth-
er or not states had a history of discriminating on the basis of age-
Congress had neglected to document any such history-it was far from
clear that such discrimination was irrational, said the majority. The ab-
sence of evidence of irrationality was critical because age is not a suspect
classification and triggers no heightened scrutiny. Thus the rational basis
test applies in judging the constitutionality of state-sponsored discrimina-
22. 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
23. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
24. Id. at 630.
25. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106
Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 296 (2006)), invalidated by Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
26. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
27. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
28. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66, 69-70.
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tion on the basis of age. The Court concluded that Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment did not empower Congress to enact the ADEA.2 9
The next in the series was Board of Trustees v. Garrett.30 This case
was the consolidation of two suits against the University of Alabama by
former employees who alleged that the school had violated a portion of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). 3 1 A majority of the
Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
support enactment of the ADA any more than it did the enactment of the
ADEA. The majority opinion in Garrett featured the same emphasis as in
Kimel that the classification of disability does not trigger any heightened
scrutiny under constitutional analysis. In enacting the ADA, Congress in
fact had marshaled an impressive record of discrimination against disa-
bled persons. But the majority rejected virtually all of the examples for
various reasons.
The first reason, following Kimel, was that not all acts of discrimi-
nation against the disabled are irrational. There are jobs that able-bodied
people can do that disabled persons cannot do without something more
than what the Court has determined to constitute "reasonable accommo-
dation." 32 So again, the lack of heightened scrutiny played a major factor
in Garrett. But the Court did not stop there. The Court also brushed aside
acts of discrimination against the disabled by local governments. True,
local governments are instrumentalities of the state. But because the
ADA authorized private suits for money damages against the state, all of
the acts of discrimination against disabled persons had to be by state em-
ployees because local governments are not covered by the Eleventh
Amendment. That, of course, meant that private acts of discrimination
against the disabled-no matter how cruel, animus-based, or utterly irra-
tional-were also irrelevant to the analysis. In the end, the Court con-
cluded that Congress had identified only six scattered acts of irrational
discrimination against disabled persons by various states over the years.
The provision of a private cause of action for money damages against
states in federal court was not a congruent and proportional remedy for
those six scattered acts of irrational state discrimination.
Thus the Court had established a two-step process for determining
whether Congress had properly used its Section 5 powers to authorize
private suits for damages against states in federal court. The first was to
scour the congressional record for findings of sufficiently widespread
29. The Commerce Clause almost certainly empowers Congress to enact the ADEA, but
because of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), Congress may not authorize private suits
for money damages against the states under the ADEA. Id. at 72-73 (holding that Congress's powers
to subject unconsenting states to suit for money damages do not extend to either the Interstate Com-
merce Clause or the Indian Commerce Clause).
30. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
32. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 385-86.
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actual constitutional violations by states. If that prong were satisfied, the
Court would proceed to whether the legislative remedy was congruent
and proportional to this history of constitutional violations.
In three cases since Garrett, the Court has upheld laws under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, permitting private suits for damag-
es against states in federal court. The first of those, Nevada Department
of Human Services v. Hibbs,33 concerned the family-care leave provision
in the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).34 When it enact-
ed the FMLA, Congress documented a sufficiently widespread history of
gender-based discrimination in the dispensation of family and medical
leave. Congress found that states had perpetuated the stereotype of wom-
en as family caretakers and men as breadwinners by giving women leave
to rear children but denying such leave to men. And, because gender
discrimination triggers some form of heightened scrutiny, the majority,
led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, was satisfied that the first prong was met.
The Court did not flyspeck the congressional findings on prior discrimi-
nation as it had done in Garrett and Kimel, but it nonetheless found that
there was a sufficient history of constitutional violations. It then went on
to find that the family-care provision of the FMLA was a congruent and
proportional response to the history of violations.
In Tennessee v. Lane,5 the Court took up the validity of a different
portion of the ADA than it had reviewed in Garrett. Lane involved a case
where a criminal defendant literally had to crawl up the stairs on his
hands and knees to a court proceeding because the local courthouse had
no elevator to accommodate his wheelchair. The Court held that this por-
tion of the ADA was supported by Section 5 on the ground that Lane had
been denied a fundamental right-access to court-which, in turn, trig-
gered heightened scrutiny under constitutional analysis. Then, in United
States v. Georgia,36 the Court had no trouble finding that a paraplegic
inmate in a state prison could sue under the same provision of the ADA
involved in Lane.37 The state had failed to provide him with a toilet that
he could use without assistance, which squarely violated his Eighth
Amendment rights.
Last Term, the Court, having zigged for several years, zagged again.
In Coleman, the Court reviewed the self-care provision in the FMLA.
Although it had upheld the family-care provision of the FMLA in Hibbs
nine years earlier, the Court now held that the self-care provision could
not be justified by Section 5. The majority, led by Justice Kennedy,
found that there was no real connection between the states' history of
33. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
35. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
36. 546 U.S. 151 (2006).
37. Id. at 159.
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gender discrimination and the self-care provision. Congress created the
self-care provision not to remedy any past gender discrimination but
simply to provide employees with the flexibility in work arrangements
necessary to care for themselves. Thus there was really no question of
whether the self-care provision was congruent and proportional to the
history of constitutional violations; the Court had found that there was no
relationship at all between the two.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg laid out a powerful historical rebuttal.
She explained that the self-care provision was part of a holistic remedy
for gender discrimination in employment and in leave policies. Without
the self-care provision, the statute as a whole was greatly hampered in its
effectiveness. But it is not my current purpose here to assess who has the
better statutory construction argument. I wish to look at the Court's
modes of review in these Section 5 cases and attempt to gauge what as-
pects appear settled and what aspects appear unsettled.
Erwin Chemerinsky (among others) has argued that the following
approach can be deduced from the cases.38 If the right at stake is one that
triggers some kind of heightened scrutiny, then it does not matter wheth-
er or to what extent Congress has documented a history of constitutional
violations. As a practical matter, that is the end of the inquiry; the legis-
lation will be found constitutional. If the right at stake is one that gener-
ally triggers only rational basis review, then Congress must document a
sufficiently widespread history of constitutional violations by the states.
This is a difficult project because discriminatory acts by local officials or
private actors do not count; only those of state officials count. Further-
more, the discrimination must be irrational because no heightened level
of scrutiny has been triggered. Even if plaintiffs can surmount this test,
they must then convince the court that Congress's chosen remedy is con-
gruent and proportional to the history of discrimination.
As I have said, the intellectual origins of the tiers-of-scrutiny ap-
proach trace back in large part to footnote four of Carolene Products.
Discrete and insular minorities are less able to obtain relief from discrim-
ination through the political process. But there is another reason to vary
the level of scrutiny based on the type of claim involved. It is a plain fact
that some constitutional violations are more stubbornly rooted in our
nation's history than others are. Yes, we have discriminated against
heavy people and short people and, in a more serious vein, against people
with learning disabilities and treatable mental health issues. But it simply
blinks reality to say that America has discriminated against those groups
as consistently and seriously as it has against such groups as African-
Americans, Mexican-Americans, Native Americans, and women. There
are certain social cleavages around which our political, economic, and
38. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 477 (5th ed. 2007).
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cultural structures have been built, and they are familiar-race, national
origin, religion, and sex. There are other traits that society has irrational-
ly made points of distinction, but not in nearly as profound a manner.
B. Why "Rational Basis" Review Should Not Govern Scrutiny ofAll
Fourteenth Amendment Legislation
But if any form of state-sponsored discrimination is irrational, Why
not give Congress broad authority to legislate against them? My answer
is trite, but nonetheless true: because the federal government is still a
government of enumerated powers. Suppose Congress were to permit
private suits in federal court against states for having levied irrational
regulatory burdens on failed businesses? Or private suits in federal court
against states that place irrational restrictions on the possession of con-
cealed handguns? Or that discriminate irrationally against cigarette
smokers? Every conceivable legislative objective can be couched as
"discrimination" against somebody, or as the deprivation of someone's
right to substantive due process.
You may not think my parade of horribles very realistic, and indeed,
you may think it more likely that Congress would do "good" and "pro-
gressive" things with near plenary powers. Even so, that would not
change my mind. Giving Congress the power to legislate about virtually
anything would throw off our existing balance of powers, with unknown
and unknowable systemic consequences. If we were to start from scratch
and redraft the Constitution, I do not know whether I would choose a
federated system where the states are "sovereign." I might opt in favor of
a centralized government. But we are not going to start from scratch, and
realistically, we cannot.
To me, that is one of the attractions of the mirror image thesis-it
puts some meaningful limits on congressional power under the Four-
teenth Amendment. That raises the next question, which is, What rela-
tionship between right and remedy should the Court require with respect
to each tier of scrutiny? On the strict scrutiny end, the answer must be
something highly deferential. Here, I would use the simple means-end
test of McCullough, which I do not view as meaningfully different from
the rational basis test used to judge the constitutionality of most state
action. The remedy must enforce constitutional rights recognized by the
Court, but the relationship between the remedy and the right merely has
to be one of plausible justification.
At the other end, What relationship must there be between legisla-
tive remedies and rights that trigger only rational basis scrutiny? I have
just explained why I oppose a highly deferential standard of reviewing
such legislation-it turns Section 5 into a near plenary grant of power to
legislate against the states on almost any subject matter. Perhaps the
Court could adopt a standard permitting legislation to enforce rights that
trigger rational basis review only when the legislation is essential to the
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preservation of such rights. My reservation about such a standard, how-
ever, comes from the same place that makes me uncomfortable with con-
gruence and proportionality. There is too much room for argument about
what legislation is essential and what is merely desirable.
At this end of the spectrum, I find myself alone with Justice Scalia,
calling for an actual constitutional violation in the case at bar. In other
words, when Congress legislates to enforce rights that trigger only ra-
tional basis review, the legislation should be held valid as applied only to
cases where the plaintiff can demonstrate an actual constitutional viola-
tion in his or her case. To put it yet another way, when it comes to rights
triggering rational basis review, Congress should not be permitted any
prophylaxis or deterrence. It should be able to provide a remedy only in
cases where the right has, in fact, been violated. Characteristic of Justice
Scalia, this is a readily administrable, bright-line rule.
Although only Justice Scalia has, to date, openly advocated such a
standard, it is consistent with the Court's actual cases scrutinizing legis-
lation to enforce rights that trigger onlyrational basis review. Kimel was
actually the consolidation of three cases. In one, Daniel Kimel and other
faculty members of a Florida state university sued to challenge the uni-
versity's failure to implement a previously announced pay increase.
Their argument was that the failure to follow through with the pay raise
had a disparate impact on older employees because they tended to have
higher base salaries. Even if Kimel and his colleagues' allegations were
true, however, the Court has held that disparate impact by itself never
makes out a constitutional violation, so my proposal is consistent with
the Court's treatment of Mr. Kimel's claim.
In the second consolidated case, Wellington Dickson sued his em-
ployer, the Florida Department of Corrections, alleging that the depart-
ment had passed him over for promotion because of his age and then
retaliated against him for filing a grievance. In the third consolidated
case, Roderick MacPherson and Marvin Narz were associate professors
at a state-run business college. They alleged that the college used an
evaluation system that had a disparate impact on older faculty members,
and that the college retaliated against them for filing grievances with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Under my thesis, whether the Court decided these cases correctly
depends on whether one takes the retaliation charges seriously. Again,
the disparate-impact claim does not state a constitutional violation. The
department passing Mr. Dickson over for a promotion because of his age
does not violate the Constitution because a rational basis can be articu-
lated for encouraging old professors to retire.3 9 Not every professor be-
yond a certain age has "lost it," but it is not irrational to think that com-
39. I resemble that remark.
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petence generally diminishes beyond a point, and it is administratively
costly to engage in case-by-case evaluations. On the other hand, retalia-
tion for filing a grievance clearly constitutes a First Amendment viola-
tion. If the retaliation claims in these cases were not merely plaintiffs-
lawyer-boilerplate tack-ons-and they usually are-then the Court was
wrong to find that they could not sue in federal court.
Garrett also involved consolidated cases. In one, Patricia Garrett
was a registered nurse in the University of Alabama's Birmingham hos-
pital. She was diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent treatment,
including chemotherapy. When she came back, she was told that she
could not have her old position back, but rather would be relegated to a
lower-paying position as a nurse manager. In the other case, Milton Ash
was a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services. He
was diagnosed with chronic asthma and sleep apnea and asked for differ-
ent assignments that would accommodate these conditions. The depart-
ment did not accommodate him to his satisfaction. Both Garrett and Ash
sued the State of Alabama in federal court for money damages pursuant
to Title I of the ADA.
Under rational basis review, neither of these plaintiffs stated a con-
stitutional violation. It is certainly possible that the hospital had promot-
ed someone else to a position in Garrett's absence such that it could not
afford to pay Garrett her old salary any longer. That would have been a
rational reason for acting as the hospital did. If that was the case, it was
stupid management and poor employee relations, but those things are not
unconstitutional. In Ash's case, perhaps there were no other open shifts.
Or perhaps the department had a strict rule not to accommodate health
conditions because then everyone would want to move their schedules
around for allergies, sleep patterns, and so on. Don't get me wrong-
what Garrett and Ash alleged clearly violated Title I of the ADA. I mere-
ly note that neither of those allegations amounts to a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, under my thesis, the Court was right
not to permit Congress to authorize these plaintiffs to sue the state for
money damages in federal court.4 0
That leaves the intermediate scrutiny cases. What relationship must
exist between congressional remedies and rights triggering intermediate
scrutiny? If you put a gun to my head, I suppose I am stuck with congru-
ence and proportionality. I just lack the imagination to articulate a test in
between strict scrutiny and rational basis review that does not require
some assessment of fit. I would need to invent a metric by which inter-
40. I would like to register my reservations about the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence. I agree that permitting private suits for money damages against unconsenting states in federal
courts is a significant federalism cost, but I do not necessarily agree with the Court's holding in
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890), that the Eleventh Amendment applies in a case where the
cause of action arises under federal law and where the plaintiff is a resident of the state.
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mediate scrutiny of legislation could be exercised without reference to
the relationship between means and ends. Yet the notion of intermediacy
seems to denote that very relationship. Perhaps the Court should simply
abandon the category of intermediate scrutiny. Sex as a classification
could be moved to strict scrutiny and commercial speech could be moved
to rational basis review. That would be my gut suggestion, but a defense
of those views will have to await another day.
C. The "Distribution and Currency of Violations" Issues
Two important issues remain, which I shall treat together because I
believe they are related. One is whether a pattern of violations in a few
states justifies legislation that applies in all states. The other is whether
Congress's power to legislate may only be based on current violations, or
whether a history of violations triggers the Section 5 power.
Under my proposal, neither of these issues arises when the claimed
right triggers only rational basis review because my proposal would re-
quire an actual constitutional violation in the case at bar. If a plaintiff can
demonstrate that his or her constitutional rights were violated by the
state, then that state was obviously among the offenders, and the viola-
tion is current.
But what if the claimed right would be reviewed under some form
of heightened scrutiny? I believe the Court should ignore the distribution
of violations among states for three reasons. One is that the types of con-
stitutional rights that trigger strict scrutiny have almost certainly been
violated in all the states at one time or another. Slavery and Jim Crow
may have been limited to the states of the former Confederacy, but at one
point or another, facially neutral laws in almost every state have been
enacted with the intent to disadvantage certain racial groups. It would be
hard to think of a single state that has not, at one time or another, dis-
criminated on the basis of religion, if even only against atheists. All
states at one time discriminated against women in their marital or crimi-
nal (rape) laws, to say nothing of their own employment policies.
Another reason to disregard the distribution of violations among
states is that when the states joined to create "a more perfect Union,""'
they surrendered some aspects of their sovereignty. One of them, in my
estimation, was the privilege of having national legislation tailored to
their idiosyncrasies. This is especially true when the problems spawning
the legislation have broad and deep roots.
The third reason to disregard the distribution of violations among
states is also the reason why Congress need not rely on current violations
to justify legislation. The framers of the Reconstruction Amendments
desperately would have wanted to avoid new forms of state-sponsored
41. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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discrimination based on race. It is beyond cavil that they saw slavery and
any version of systematic racial oppression as a moral and practical fail-
ing of the nation. Did they succeed in eliminating all such oppression?
For a few years, they came close, but that brief period of near formal
equality proved all too transient. Jim Crow soon took hold and recreated
the formal system of racial subordination.
That is why the courts must not insist upon current violations to up-
hold legislation enforcing rights that trigger strict scrutiny. There are
certain social dynamics that do not change over time. The players may
change, but the dynamics remain the same. It is not only the United
States. Look around the world. Most societies can absorb a small number
of people who are not of the dominant race without much trouble. But let
the number swell to significant proportions and the dominant group feels
threatened. The dominant group then is tempted to use the law to rein-
force its dominance. Religions say they are in favor of freedom of wor-
ship until they have enough power to seize the state apparatus and en-
force their beliefs on everyone. If your version of the Supreme Deity and
holy scripture are right, then anyone who disagrees must be wrong-and
their souls must be saved by whatever means necessary. The racial and
religious targets change over the generations, but the human story re-
mains the same. That is why, when it comes to discrimination on the
basis of race or religion, it is both foolish and dangerous to say, "Oh, that
was then, this is now."
One last loose end. It is true that the Court has defined "race dis-
crimination" under the Equal Protection Clause to mean only "intention-
al" discrimination, eschewing "disparate impact" as sufficient proof of a
constitutional violation.4 2 Thus, one might argue against my proposal on
the ground that remedial legislation based on race where no intentional
discrimination can be proved would be struck down. One possible illus-
tration would be the proposed North Carolina Racial Justice Act,43 which
would have dealt with racially disproportionate capital sentencing. With
respect to this example, I simply disagree with the Court's conclusion
that there is not intentional race discrimination involved in dispropor-
tionate capital sentencing. In the study involved in McCleskey v. Kemp,"
and in subsequent studies, the late David Baldus and his colleagues of-
fered statistical evidence from which intentional race discrimination not
only could have been inferred, but also should have been inferred.4 5 In
some studies it was based on the race of the victim and in others on the
42. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(1994) as recognized in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010 (2011).
44. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
45. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS passim (1990).
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race of the defendant, but I believe it is inconsistent with the purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment to deny an inference of intentional discrimi-
nation in capital sentencing.
In general, my response regarding disparate impact is this: in true
cases where no inference of even partial racial motivation is warranted,
the plaintiff should not win on a claim of race discrimination. But I be-
lieve both the Supreme Court and lower courts have been too quick to
accept "plausibly neutral" explanations that were quite possibly pretextu-
al. The attitude that "we decline to assume that what is unexplained is
invidious" 4 6 is, at least in some contexts, simply not a faithful application
of existing doctrine. It is significant that Justice Powell, who wrote those
words, later admitted that he had come to regard the McCleskey decision
as a mistake.47
V. How DOES MY THESIS AFFECT THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT?
So much for legislation enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. What are the implications for the Fifteenth Amendment?
As some of you may know, a D.C. Circuit panel in May handed
down an opinion in a case called Shelby County v. Holder,4 8 in which
Shelby County, Alabama, claimed that the preclearance provision of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, as reenacted for a period of twenty-five years
in 2006, exceeds Congress's enforcement powers under the Fifteenth
Amendment. 49 The panel voted 2-1 to uphold the preclearance provision,
and most observers expect the Supreme Court to take the case.so
The Court will not be writing on a blank slate. In 1966, the Court
decided a case called South Carolina v. Katzenbach,5 ' which made it
clear that the federal courts were to review Congress's enforcement
choices under the Fifteenth Amendment in the most deferential manner.52
But in 2009, the Supreme Court handed down an opinion whose tenor
can best be characterized as, "It's not 1965 anymore, and all bets are
off."
The 2009 case is called Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
No. 1 v. Holder.53 A utility district in Texas challenged the constitution-
46. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313.
47. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451 (1994).
48. 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
49. Id. at 856-57, 863-64.
50. The Court did grant certiorari in Shelby County on November 9, 2012. The grant is limited
to the following question: "Whether Congress'[s] decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act under the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act
exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth
Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution." Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-96).
51. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
52. Id. at 325-27.
53. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
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ality of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires some states and
localities to obtain preclearance for certain types of changes to their vot-
ing systems. Congress first enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1957 pursu-
ant to its enforcement authority under the Fifteenth Amendment and has
reenacted it numerous times, most recently in 2006, finding that it is still
necessary to combat race discrimination in voting. The utility district had
never itself discriminated in its elections, and requiring it to engage in
the preclearance procedure exceeded Congress's Fifteenth Amendment
powers, the district argued.
The Supreme Court held in favor of the utility district, but not on
the constitutional question. The Court found that the utility district was
entitled to a statutory exemption from the preclearance procedure-
known in the Voting Rights Act lexicon as a bailout-and therefore the
constitutional question was avoided. But the Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Roberts, stated that the preclearance provision was consti-
tutionally suspect: "§ 5, 'which authorizes federal intrusion into sensitive
areas of state and local policymaking, imposes substantial 'federalism
costs.' These federalism costs have caused Members of this Court to
express serious misgivings about the constitutionality of § 5."
Translation: Preclearance is strong prophylactic medicine. Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for all the Justices save Justice Thomas (who
would have struck down § 5 on the spot), then engaged in what might
fairly be characterized as a congruence and proportionality analysis:
Some of the conditions that we relied upon in upholding this statu-
tory scheme [in the past] have unquestionably improved. Things have
changed in the South....
... It may be that these improvements are insufficient and that
conditions continue to warrant preclearance under the Act. But the
Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs.5 5
The Court then hinted at its concerns about the fact that preclear-
ance is required of certain states and not of others-and that the basis for
singling out the states required to engage in preclearance may not be up-
to-date.
The evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrat-
ed in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance. The statute's cov-
erage formula is based on data that is now more than 35 years old,
and there is considerable evidence that it fails to account for current
political conditions. 56
54. Id. at 202 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
55. Id. at 202-03.
56. Id. at 203.
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Despite extensive briefing on the question, the Court declined to de-
cide whether congruence and proportionality was required or whether the
proper test was one of rationality.57
Thus, the Northwest Austin Court expressed strong disapproval for
the notion that Congress can base current and continuing remedies on
conditions that may have been eliminated decades ago. Such remedies
impose serious federalism costs, and such costs can only be justified by
roughly commensurate current needs in enforcing Fifteenth Amendment
rights.
I am no expert on the Voting Rights Act, but clearly not everyone
who supports the preclearance provision thinks it is perfect as it is cur-
rently written. In particular, there seems to be too much emphasis on
statewide redistricting, where discriminatory behavior is pretty transpar-
ent, and where the Justice Department has the greatest potential to en-
gage in partisan abuse of its preclearance powers. The current real needs
lie more in local elections and their attendant conditions, which are not
highly transparent, where it takes only a few bad actors to shut down
groups of minority voters, and where the Attorney General of the United
States has little incentive to game the system through his or her preclear-
ance powers. Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Michael Pitts have de-
bated the matter, and despite their divergent conclusions regarding the
overall desirability of the preclearance provision, they agree on the point
just mentioned.
In his Shelby County opinion upholding the preclearance provision,
Judge David Tatel of the D.C. Circuit dutifully followed Northwest Aus-
tin dicta on the standard of review. Because Northwest Austin stated that
the preclearance provision raises serious constitutional questions under
either the congruence and proportionality test used in cases like City of
Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett or under the rational basis test used in cases
like Hibbs and Lane, Judge Tatel logically assumed for the sake of ar-
gument that the congruence and proportionality standard applied-yet he
found that the preclearance provision satisfied even that demanding
test."
Why? Because the congressional record contained sufficient evi-
dence from which Congress could reasonably conclude that racial dis-
crimination in covered jurisdictions remains so serious and pervasive that
individual litigation (as opposed to the systematic, prophylactic preclear-
ance system) is insufficient to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. As re-
counted in Judge Tatel's opinion, the town of Kilmichael, Mississippi,
cancelled a 2001 election when there was "an unprecedented number" of
57. Id. at 204.
58. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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African-American candidates. 5 9 In 1998, Webster County, Georgia, pro-
posed to reduce the black population in three of the school board's dis-
tricts after the electorate voted in a majority of black board members for
the first time in history. In 1993, Washington Parish, Louisiana, created a
new at-large seat "to ensure that no white incumbent would lose his
seat."6 0 In the early 1990s, Mississippi legislators opposed a "redistrict-
ing plan that would have increased the number of black majority dis-
tricts, referring to the plan publicly as the 'black plan' and privately as
the 'nigger plan."'6 Georgia's state House Reapportionment Committee
Chairman "told his colleagues on numerous occasions, 'I don't want to
draw nigger districts."' 62
No. It's not 1965 anymore. But these incidents from the early 1990s
to the early 2000s demonstrate that the states of the former Confederacy
still have powerful forces whose clear intention is to minimize the elec-
toral impact of African-Americans. Would I limit the preclearance re-
quirement to the states of the former Confederacy? No, I would not. I
will come out and say that I think it's probably needed in parts of Arizo-
na, parts of Texas, and parts of my home state of California. Should pre-
clearance continue to be required at the statewide level of every single
Southern state? Maybe not. Maybe preclearance ought to be concentrated
at the level of local government.
But here is my point, and it is as unoriginal as any point can be: de-
cisions about what governmental entities should be subject to preclear-
ance are for Congress to decide, not the Court. As Judge Tatel said of the
2006 renewal of the preclearance provision, "Congress found that serious
and widespread intentional discrimination persisted in covered jurisdic-
tions and that 'case-by-case enforcement alone . . . would leave minority
citizens with [an] inadequate remedy."' 63 That conclusion is hardly irra-
tional, considering the evidence that faced Congress in 2006, and that
ought to be the end of the inquiry. Race discrimination, no less under the
Fifteenth Amendment than under the Fourteenth, is the most suspect kind
of state action. When Congress acts pursuant to its Fourteenth or Fif-
teenth Amendment enforcement powers to combat such action, those
enactments must be given the widest berth possible. Any plausible justi-
fication that can be articulated in favor of the legislation-whether or not
Congress was actually motivated by it-must be permitted to sanction
the enforcement scheme. The Court would clearly stray beyond its prop-
er boundaries in our constitutional system if it were to put the magnify-
59. Id at 865 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 36-37 (2006) (Jud. Comm. Rep.) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
60. Id (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 38 (2006) (Jud. Comm. Rep.) (internal quotation
mark omitted)).
61. Id at 866 (quoting Modern Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 22 (2006)).
62. Id (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 67 (2006) (Jud. Comm. Rep.)).
63. Id. at 872 (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 57 (2006)).
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ing glass on the congressional record and insist upon the tightest possible
fit between remedy and malady in every single situation. The generic cry
of "federalism costs" does not, and cannot, change that boundary.
Judge Tatel's masterful opinion for the panel in Shelby County pro-
vides a wonderful blueprint for the Court to uphold the preclearance pro-
vision, while expressing a desire for Congress to rework the provision to
make it more focused on local practices than on statewide redistricting.
The only disagreement I have with Judge Tatel stems from the fact that
he is a judge deciding a real case and I am a commentator. The differ-
ence is in the standard of review. He apparently felt compelled to apply
the congruence and proportionality standard. As I mentioned earlier,
even in the cases where the rights trigger heightened scrutiny, the Court
insists that it still does perform some kind of congruence and proportion-
ality review, although it is questionable whether the legislative facts sup-
port that conclusion. I would make it clear right now, just as I have made
clear with respect to those Fourteenth Amendment cases involving rights
that trigger strict scrutiny, that the congruence and proportionality test
should not apply. The only question should be whether Congress had any
conceivable rational basis to enact the remedial legislation-and, in the
spirit of true rational basis review, the facts supporting that rational basis
need not appear in the congressional record at the time of enactment.
That is the only way for the Court to square its standards of reviewing
state action for constitutionality with its standards for reviewing congres-
sional acts enforcing constitutional rights, both with respect to the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
No way, you say? Northwestern Austin portends nothing but a bat-
ting down of the preclearance provision in toto? That certainly could
happen, but don't bet the rent money just yet. Consider the following
quote:
In assessing those questions, we are keenly mindful of our institu-
tional role. We fully appreciate that judging the constitutionality of
an Act of Congress is "the gravest and most delicate duty that this
Court is called on to perform." "The Congress is a coequal branch of
government whose Members take the same oath we do to uphold the
Constitution of the United States." The Fifteenth Amendment em-
powers "Congress," not the Court, to determine in the first instance
what legislation is needed to enforce it.6
Those words are straight from the Chief Justice's opinion in North-
west Austin. And don't think for a minute that they are just window
dressing. Every one of those nine Justices takes both federalism and sep-
64. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. I v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204-06 (2009) (quoting
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring) and Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981), respectively).
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aration of powers seriously. Every one of them is keenly aware that the
Court must stay within its proper role when reviewing legislation. Each
of them sees things differently at the margins, and from different per-
spectives-that's why there are nine of them, not just one. But don't as-
sume that any of them are going to vote to chuck the preclearance provi-
sion without a good long look, just as none of them is going to vote to
rubber-stamp it. The Justices are like your family members. At times
they make you crazy, you want to strangle them, you wonder how you
could really be related to them. There are days when you disagree on
everything. But at the end of the day, you know they really want to do
the right thing, and in this case, that would be to apply rational basis re-
view to all congressional enactments enforcing the right not to be dis-
criminated against on the basis of one's race.
